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Decentralized Pricing and the Equivalence between Nash and
Walrasian Equilibrium
Antoine Mandel∗ and Herbert Gintis†‡
Abstract
We introduce, in the standard exchange economy model, market games in which
agents use private prices as strategies. We give conditions on the game form that
ensure that the only strict Nash equilibria of the game are the competitive equilibria
of the underlying economy. This equivalence result has two main corollaries. First,
it adds to the evidence that competitive equilibria can be strategically stable even
in small economies. Second, it implies that competitive equilibria have good local
stability properties under a large class of evolutionary learning dynamics.
1. Introduction
In his Elements of Pure Economics (see Walras 1874), Walras introduces two de-
scriptions of the price adjustment process in a market economy. On the one hand,
he puts forward the taˆtonnement as a “theoretical” model. On the other hand, he
emphasizes that in practice, the driver of price adjustment is free competition. He
characterizes the latter by three conditions (see Docke`s and Potier, 2005): free
market entry and exit, freedom to set prices and freedom to set production levels.
This paper investigates a game theoretic model of price formation that exhibits
the characteristics of free competition in the latter sense. Our key behavioral as-
sumption is that individual agents set prices in a decentralized manner. Our main
result is to show the equivalence between Nash and general equilibria in this con-
text. More precisely, we consider a standard exchange economy in which each
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agent has a trade strategy that consists of a vector of private prices for the goods
he is endowed with and the goods he consumes. These private prices represent
the prices at which the agent is willing to sell the goods he supplies to the market
and the maximum prices he is willing to pay for the goods he demands from the
market. We consider that agents strategically update their private prices in order to
improve their competitive position on different markets. The historically inclined
reader will note that this approach closely matches Walras’ original description of
free competition:
As buyers, traders make their demand by outbidding each other. As
sellers, traders make their offers by underbidding each other. . . The
markets that are best organized from the competitive standpoint are
those in which. . . the terms of every exchange are openly announced
and an opportunity is given to sellers to lower their prices and to buy-
ers to raise their bids. (Walras 1874, paragraph 41).
We say that a profile of private prices is uniform if all the agents in the economy
use the same private prices. We then identify general equilibria of the economy
with uniform price profiles for which the common price is a market equilibrium
price. Our main result is that these general equilibrium price profiles are the only
strict Nash equilibria of the model. This result holds provided that competition is
effective in the sense that: (i) when there is positive excess supply in one period,
a seller who failed to secure a transaction can gain by slightly undercutting his
competitors’ prices, (ii) when there is positive excess demand, a buyer who failed to
secure a transaction can increase his utility by slightly outbidding his competitors.
The equivalence between general market equilibria and strict Nash equilibria in
our model has two main corollaries. First, it adds to the evidence reviewed below
that competitive equilibria can be strategically stable even in small economies.
Second, it is a well-known result in evolutionary game theory (see Weibull, 1995;
Gintis, 2009) that in multi-population games, strict Nash equilibria are the only
asymptotically stable points of the replicator dynamic, and more generally of any
monotone dynamic. Hence, if we treat an exchange economy as the stage game
of an evolutionary process in which each agent’s initial inventory is replenished in
each period, general equilibria will be the only asymptotically stable states.
Our contribution is related to the large body of literature that focuses on the
strategic and evolutionary foundations of general equilibrium. A first strand of
literature (see in particular Rubinstein-Wolinsky 1985, Gale 1986a and 1986b,
Mclennan and Sonnenschein 1991, and Kunimoto and Serrano 2002) builds on
models of bargaining a` la Rubinstein (1982) to provide strategic foundations to
Walrasian equilibrium. It considers agents who are matched in a sequence of pair-
wise interactions during which they bargain their endowments and decide whether
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to leave or to stay in the market. The main result in this literature is that agents
exit the market when they reach their Walrasian allocation. Hence this literature
provides mechanisms that entail the stability of Walrasian allocations. However
these mechanisms do not plausibly represent actual market institution and do not
address the stability of equilibrium resulting from price dynamics because prices
are absent in these models.
In the literature on strategic market games pioneered by Shapley and Shubik
(1977) and surveyed in Giraud (2003), institutions are central. Prices are deter-
mined at trading posts at which strategically determined nominal demands and real
supplies are confronted. Early contributions in this strand of literature have fo-
cused on large economies. Their main result is that, as the economy is increasingly
replicated, the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic market game converges to the
set of general market equilibria of the underlying economy. Our contribution is
more closely related to the subsequent literature that has focused on strategic sta-
bility in small economies. Peck and Shell (1990) consider a market game model
a` la Shapley-Shubik in which traders may make arbitrary short sales. This possi-
bility of short sales fosters liquidity and market competition, allowing competitive
equilibria to emerge even in small economies. An alternative approach to increase
liquidity, pursued by Ghosal and Morelli (2004), is to allow for retrading. Com-
petitive equilibria can then be supported as allocations of the market game in the
infinite-time limit. Hence, market games a` la Shapley-Shubik yield very similar
conclusions to these of the present paper about the strategic stability of competitive
equilibria. The key difference is that we consider a decentralized price-formation
process in which prices are set by individual agents, whereas in the market game lit-
erature prices are set centrally at trading posts. The importance of such differences
in the price adjustment mechanism is strongly emphasized in Kumar and Shubik
(2004). Additionally, whereas our result is an equivalence, competitive equilibria
generally form a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria of market games. Yet,
recent experimental results obtained by Duffy et al. (2011), show that subjects have
a tendency to coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria rather than on Pareto inferior
ones. Moreover, as the number of subjects participating in the market game in-
creases, the Nash equilibrium that experimental subjects achieve approximates the
associated competitive equilibrium of the underlying economy.
These experimental results on market games are complementary to the ones ob-
tained in continuous double-auction experiments (see Smith, 1982; Asparouhova
et al., 2011, for surveys of the relevant literature), which give strong support for
competitive outcomes.4 Our approach is closely related to the theoretical liter-
4There are also notable exceptions such as Anderson et al. 2004, who show that continuous
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ature developed to explore the stability of competitive equilibria in continuous
double-auctions (Friedman, 1991; Easley and Ledyard, 1993; Gjerstad and Dick-
haut, 1998; Lesourne et al., 2006). First and foremost, private prices are determined
by individual traders in both cases. Second, some of the examples of exchange
mechanisms considered below are very similar to double auctions. Third, consis-
tently with the evolutionary dimension of our work, the continuous double-auction
literature generally consider traders as myopic.
From this last perspective, our approach relates to the evolutionary game theory
literature on market dynamics: Vega-Redondo (1997) analyzes the convergence to
the Walrasian equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly where firms update quantities in
an evolutionary fashion, Alo´s-Ferrer et al. (2000) provide an evolutionary model
of Bertrand competition, Serrano and Volij (2008) study the stability of Walrasian
equilibrium in markets for indivisible goods, and several contributions (Mandel
and Botta, 2009; Kim and Wong, 2011; Mandel and Gintis, 2014), investigate evo-
lutionary dynamics in specific exchange economies. Though less precise on dy-
namical aspects, our contribution provides results that are more generic than those
of the existing literature as it applies to a broad class of exchange economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model
economy. Section 3 defines a class of market games based on private prices in this
economy and gives necessary conditions for the stability of equilibrium. Section 4
analyzes in greater detail the necessary conditions for competition to entail a stable
price adjustment process. In section 5, we illustrate numerically the extension of
our results to Markovian price adjustment processes. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Walrasian Economy
We consider an economy with a finite set of goods G = {1, . . . , n}, and a finite
set of agents A = {1, . . . ,m}. Each agent i ∈ A has consumption set X = Rn+, a
utility function ui: X→R+ and an initial endowment ei = (ei1, . . . , ein) ∈ X . We
denote this economy by E(u, e), where u = (u1, . . . , um) and e = (e1, . . . , em).
Our subsequent analysis will be greatly simplified in the case where for each
agent one can distinguish consumption goods, those the agent consumes, from en-
dowment goods, those with which the agent is endowed.5 For agent i ∈ A, the set
of endowment goods is given by Ei = {g ∈ G | eig > 0}. The set of consumption
goods is denoted by Ci and characterized by the following assumption.
double auction can yield taˆtonnement-like orbits in the Scarf economy.
5This setting is sometimes referred to as “buy-or-sell game” in the economic litterature and is
known under the name of Fisher economies in the algorithmic game theory literature.
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Assumption 1 (Goods). For all i ∈ A, there exists Ci ⊂ G such that Ci ∩Ei = ∅
and for all x, y ∈ X one has: (∀g ∈ Ci, xg = yg)⇒ ui(x) = ui(y).
Accordingly, we define the set of buyers of good g as Bg = {i ∈ A | g ∈ Ci}, and
the set of sellers of good g as Sg = {i ∈ A | g ∈ Ei}.
The following concepts are standard in the analysis of exchange economies.
• An allocation x ∈ Xm of goods is feasible if for all g ∈ G :
m∑
i=1
xig ≤
m∑
i=1
eig.
We write A(e1, . . . , em) = A(e) ⊂ Xm for the set of feasible allocations.
• The price space is P = Rn−1+ × {1} and good n is called the nume´raire
good.
• The demand of agent i is a mapping di : P × R+→X that associates to
a price p ∈ P and an income w ∈ R+ the utility-maximizing individual
allocations satisfying the budget constraint:
di(p, w) = argmax{xi∈X|p·xi≤w}ui(xi).
• A feasible allocation x ∈ A(e) is an equilibrium allocation if there exists a
price p ∈ P such that for all i, xi ∈ di(p, p · ei). The price p is then called
an equilibrium price. We denote the set of equilibrium prices by Pequi(u, e).
• A feasible allocation x ∈ A(e) and a price p ∈ P form a quasi-equilibrium
if for all i and for all y ∈ Xm, ui(yi) > ui(xi) implies p · yi > p · xi.
Our focus being on the stability of equilibrium, we place ourselves throughout
the paper in a setting where sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilib-
rium hold. First, we assume that utility functions satisfy the following standard
conditions.
Assumption 2 (Utility). For all i ∈ A, ui is continuous, its restriction to RCi is
strictly concave and locally non-satiated and ui(x) > 0 only if for all g ∈ Ci,
xg > 0.
This assumption suffices to guarantee the existence of a quasi-equilibrium. More-
over, the strict concavity assumption implies that demand mappings are single-
valued, which proves useful below. The last condition implies that the consumption
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of each consumption good is necessary and is fairly standard in general equilibrium
theory (see Mas-Collel 1989).
Second, to ensure that every quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium allocation, it
suffices to assume that at a quasi-equilibrium, agents do not receive the minimal
possible income (see Hammond, 1993; Florenzano, 2005). This condition is satis-
fied when all initial endowments are in the interior of the consumption set, as well
as in settings with corner endowments such as those investigated in Scarf (1960)
and Gintis (2007). Formally, the assumption can be stated as follows.
Assumption 3 (Income). For every quasi-equilibrium (p, x), there exists an allo-
cation y such that p · xi > p · yi for all i ∈ A.
The Utility Assumption (2) and the Income Assumption (3) then imply that the
economy E(u, e) has at least one equilibrium (see Florenzano, 2005). We shall
assume they hold throughout the paper and will further restrict attention to the
generic case where the set Pequi of equilibria is finite (see Balasko 2009).
3. Exchange Economies with Private Prices
3.1. The Game Form
We represent the exchange process in the economy E(u, e) as a game in which
agents set prices in a decentralized manner and the resulting distribution of prices
determines the agents’ allocations. More precisely, we consider that each agent
i ∈ A has a strategy consisting of a private price vector pii ∈ Pi = RGi+ , where
Gi = Ci∪Ei. This private price vector represents the prices at which he is willing
to sell the goods he supplies to the market and the maximum prices he is willing to
pay for the goods he demands. We then associate to the economy E(u, e) the game
G(u, e, ξ) such that:
• Each agent i ∈ A has the set of prices Pi as strategy set, so that the set of
strategy profiles for the game is Π = P1 × · · · × Pm.
• The game form is defined by an exchange mechanism ξ : Π→A(e) that
associates to a profile of private prices pi ∈ Π a feasible allocation ξ(pi) =
(ξ1(pi), . . . , ξm(pi)) ∈ A(e).
• The payoff of player i is ui(ξi(pi)).
Many exchange processes can be represented in this way including central
clearing systems such as double auctions, simultaneous multilateral exchanges as
usually considered in general equilibrium models with out-of-equilibrium features
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such as Grandmont (1977), and sequential bilateral exchanges such as those con-
sidered by Gintis (2007, 2012).
3.2. Definitions and Notation
In our analysis of the game G(u, e, ξ), we shall use the following notions:
• A strategy profile pi ∈ Π is p-uniform for price p ∈ P if, for all i ∈ A and
g ∈ Gi, one has piig = pg.
• A p-uniform strategy profile pi is a general equilibrium price profile if p ∈
Pequi(u, e).
• A strategy profile pi is p-seller uniform if for all g ∈ G and all i ∈ Sg, we
have piig = pg.
• For pi ∈ Π, i ∈ A, g ∈ G, and qig ∈ R+ we denote by (pi−ig, qig) the strategy
profile pi′ such that pi′ig = qig and for (j, h) ∈ A × Gj , (j, h) 6= (i, g), we
have pi′jh = pijh.
• For pi ∈ Π, i ∈ A, and p ∈ Pi we denote by (pi−i, p) the strategy profile pi′
such that pi′i = p and for j ∈ A, j 6= i, pi′j = pij .
3.3. Strict Nash Equilibria and Stability
In the following, we will specify a broad class of exchange processes ξ for which
general equilibrium price profiles coincide with strict Nash equilibria of the game
G(u, e, ξ). These are defined as follows:
Definition 1. A strategy profile pi ∈ Π is a strict Nash equilibrium of G(u, e, ξ) if
for all i ∈ A and all p ∈ Pi such that p 6= pii, one has:
ui(ξi(pi)) > ui(ξi(pi−i, p)).
Our focus on strict Nash equilibrium is motivated by its central role in the the-
ory of learning in games. In evolutionary game theory (see Weibull, 1995; Gintis,
2009) most of the learning processes, including the replicator dynamic, are mono-
tone dynamics in the sense that players tend to switch from worse to better perform-
ing strategies. A key result is that for monotone dynamics, strict Nash equilibria
of the stage game are the only asymptotically stable states (see Weibull 1995).
Hence, if they can be identified with strict Nash equilibria of the game G(u, e, ξ),
general market equilibria of the economy E(u, e) will be the only asymptotically
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stable states for any monotone dynamic. In particular, this sheds light on the con-
vergence to general equilibrium observed in the simulations in Gintis (2007) and
Gintis (2012) where agents update their prices by imitating those of more success-
ful peers. Indeed there is a well-established relationship between these stochastic
imitation models and the replicator dynamic (see Benaim and Weibull, 2003).
Note however that observing other agents’ payoffs is not a necessary condition
for the asymptotic stability of strict Nash equilibria. For example, Ianni (2013)
shows that strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable states for reinforcement
learning processes, for which price updates depends only on an agent’s own expe-
rience. More generally, through the replicator dynamic, the stability of strict Nash
equilibria extend to a broad class of learning dynamics. Indeed, the replicator forms
the backbone of many learning processes. In particular, Hopkins (2002) shows that
stochastic fictitious play and reinforcement learning with experimentation can both
be written as a perturbed form of the evolutionary replicator dynamic and Shalizi
(2009) shows that rather mild conditions ensure an equivalence between Bayesian
updating and the replicator dynamic.
Beyond dynamic stability, the equivalence between strict Nash and general
equilibria will guarantee that general market equilibria are risk-dominant because
they are the only strict equilibria.
3.4. An axiomatic characterization of stable exchange processes
To analyze the relationships between the behavior of the agents in the economy
E(u, e) and the game G(u, e, ξ), we first extend the notion of demand to our frame-
work with private prices. In this setting, an agent’s demand may depend not only
on his own private prices, but also on the prices posted by his potential suppliers.
For instance, a buyer of good g may sample a subset of sellers of good g who post
their selling prices, and choose his demand for g based on the information received.
To subsume all possible cases under a common framework, we assume that each
agent i has an extended demand function δi : Π ×R+ → X , that associates to a
strategy profile pi ∈ Π and an income w ∈ R+, a demand δi(pi,w).
Given that our analysis takes place out of equilibrium, realized income cannot
be determined ex ante as it depends on the particular trades an agent succeeds
in executing. Rather, we assume that agents choose strategies based on expected
income. The income expected by an agent is also prima facie a function of the
complete distribution of private prices. In particular, the expected income of an
agent g can depend on the prices set by his competitors. Hence, we represent the
income expected by seller i ∈ Sg on good g market by a function wig : Π → R+
and his total expected income by wi =
∑
g∈Ei wig.
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Therefore, when the prevailing strategy profile is pi, we refer to δi(pi,w(pi))
as the extended demand (or simply the demand if there is no ambiguity) of agent
i. We say there is excess demand or excess supply for good g at a strategy profile
pi ∈ Π if∑i∈Bg δig(pi,w(pi)) >∑j∈Sg ejg, or∑i∈Bg δig(pi,w(pi)) <∑j∈Sg ejg,
respectively. When the former inequalities are weak, we say respectively that there
is weak excess demand or weak excess supply.
On the basis of this notion of extended demand, we can relate the behavior of
agents in the private price game and in the general equilibrium economy. We shall
first assume that when the strategy profile is uniform and the extended demand and
income functions coincide with their general-equilibrium counterparts:
Assumption 4 (Price Consistency). For all agents i and all pi ∈ Π,
1. wih(pi) ≤ piiheih, with equality when pi is p-uniform;
2. If pi is p-uniform, then δi(pi, ·) = di(p, ·).
Second, we shall assume that at a general equilibrium price profile, the corre-
sponding equilibrium allocation prevails.
Assumption 5 (Equilibrium). If pi ∈ Π is a p-uniform general equilibrium price
profile, then for all agents i and all prices q ∈ Pi,
1. ξi(pi) = di(p, p · ei).
2. If ui(ξi(pi−i, q)) ≥ ui(di(p, p · ei)) then either q ≤ pi or wi(pi−i, q) ≥ p · ei.
The first part of the assumption is a minimal efficiency requirement on the ex-
change process without which no relation could be established between the equilib-
rium strategy profiles of G(u, e, ξ) and the equilibria of the economy E(u, e). The
second part of the assumption ensures that, at a general equilibrium price profile,
the exchange mechanism is consistent with the agent’s demand. Namely, there can
be a profitable deviation from a general equilibrium price profile only if the budget
set increases through an increase of income or a decrease in prices.
We now turn to the constraints private prices place on trading out of equilib-
rium. A private price represents the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay for
one unit of good and conversely the minimum price a seller is willing to accept
for one unit of good. Hence, the least constraint one can impose on the trading
mechanism is that buyers whose private price for a good g is below this of the low-
est seller price do not receive any allocation of good g. Conversely sellers whose
private price for good g is above the highest buyer price cannot raise any income
on the market for good g. That is, we have:
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Assumption 6 (Price Compatibility). For any strategy profile pi ∈ Π and any
good g, we have:
1. For any buyer i ∈ Bg, if for all sellers j ∈ Sg, pijg > piig, then ξig(pi) = 0.
2. For any seller j ∈ Sg, if for all buyers i ∈ Bg, piig < pijg, then wjg(pi) = 0.
We expect competition to be the key force leading to equilibrium in a decen-
tralized economy. Accordingly, we shall assume that the exchange mechanism
implements some form of competition both among buyers and among sellers. To
account for competition among buyers, we assume that when there is positive ex-
cess demand for good g, a buyer has incentive to outbid his competitors.
Assumption 7 (Buyer Competition). Let pi ∈ Π be such that there is excess de-
mand for good g. Then there exists a buyer i ∈ Bg and a price qig > piig such that
ui(ξi(pi−ig, qig)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi)).
For competition among sellers, we assume that when there is excess supply
for good g, a seller of good g can raise his market share and hence his income by
undercutting his competitors. That is:
Assumption 8 (Seller Competition). Let pi ∈ Π be such that there is weak excess
supply for good g and there are sellers i, j ∈ Sg with piig > pijg. Then there is a
price qig < piig such that wjg(pi−ig, qig) ≥ wjg(pi).
The Seller Competition Assumption (8) will have an actual impact on behav-
ior only if, all other things being equal, an agent’s allocation is a non-decreasing
function of income. Therefore we posit:
Assumption 9 (Income Monotonicity). Let pi, pi′ ∈ Π, and suppose that for some
agent i, we have pi−i = pi′−i and for all g ∈ Ci, piig = pi′ig. Then ifwi(pi) ≥ wi(pi′),
we have ui(ξi(pi)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi′)).
Last, in order to prevent buyers from indefinitely increasing their prices, one should
assume that there is some form of counterweight to the Buyer Competition As-
sumption (7). That is, in case of excess supply, buyers incur losses if their private
price for a good is above the highest selling price (for instance, because price dis-
persion hampers coordination).
Assumption 10 (Homogeneous Pricing). Let pi ∈ Π be such that there is weak
excess supply for good g and for some buyer i ∈ Bg, piig > maxj∈Sg pijg. Then
there is a price qig < piig such that ui(ξi(pi−ig, qig)) ≥ ui(ξ(pi)).
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To sum up, we have on the one hand structural assumptions (4) to (6) that en-
sure the consistency of the exchange game with the underlying economy and on the
other hand behavioral assumptions (7) to (10) that ensure the exchange mechanism
implements some form of competition in the Walrasian sense. These conditions
suffice to ensure the strategic stability of Walrasian equilibrium. Namely, we have:
Theorem 1. Let E(u, e) be an economy and ξ an exchange mechanism such that
Assumptions (2) to (10) hold. Then a strategy profile pi is a strict Nash equilib-
rium of the game G(u, e, ξ) if and only if pi is p-uniform for some general market
equilibrium price vector p.
Proof: Suppose pi is a p-uniform general equilibrium price profile. We must show
that pi is a strict Nash equilibrium. According to the Equilibrium Assumption (5),
for all agents i, ξi(pi) = di(p, p · ei). Suppose agent i deviates to a price vector
q 6= pi.
For g ∈ Ei, we have:
• If qg > pg, then according to the Price Compatibility Assumption (6), we
have wig(pi−i, q) = 0.
• If qg < pg, then according to the Price Consistency Assumption (4), we have
wig(pi−i, q) ≤ qgeig < pgeig = wig(pi).
Hence we have
wi(q, pi−i)
{
< wi(pi) if qg 6= pg for some g ∈ Ei
= wi(pi) otherwise.
(1)
Then, for g ∈ Ci, we have three possibilities:
• Case 1: There is some g ∈ Ci such that qg < pg. Then according to the Price
Compatibility Assumption (6), we have ξig(pi−i, q) = 0. This implies, by the
Goods Assumption (1), that ui(ξi(pi−i, q)) < ui(di(p, p · ei)) = ui(ξi(pi)).
• Case 2: For all g ∈ Ci, qg ≥ pg with the inequality being strict for some g.
As moreover, according to equation (1), we have wi(q, pi−i) ≤ wi(pi), it is
clear from the Equilibrium Assumption (5) that ui(ξi(pi−i, q)) < ui(ξi(pi)).
• Case 3: qg = pq for all g ∈ Ci. Then, as q 6= p, there is a good h ∈ Ei
such that qh 6= ph. This implies according to (1) that wi(pi−i, q) < wi(pi)
and hence, using the Equilibrium Assumption (5), that ui(ξi(pi−i, q)) <
ui(ξi(pi)).
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This proves that every general equilibrium price profile is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, let us show that if pi ∈ Π is not a general equilibrium price pro-
file then pi is not a strict Nash equilibrium of G(u, e, ξ). To prove this result by
contradiction, suppose pi were a strict Nash equilibrium.
• According to the Buyer Competition Assumption (7), if there is excess de-
mand for good g for the strategy profile pi, then there is a buyer i ∈ Bg and
a price qig > piig such that ui(ξi(pi−ig, q)) ≥ ui(ξ(pi)) and hence pi cannot
be a strict Nash equilibrium. By contraposition, this implies that there can
be no excess demand for any good at the price profile pi.
• Let us then remark that if pi is a p-uniform strategy profile, then by the Price
Consistency Assumption (4) we have that for all i ∈ A, δi(pi,wi(pi)) =
di(p, p · ei). Walras Law then implies that, unless p is an equilibrium price,
there is excess demand for at least one good. This would contradict the
preceding point. If the only good for which there is excess demand is the
nume´raire good, there must be excess supply for another good and a similar
argument applies.
Hence pi is not a p-uniform strategy profile.
• We now have that pi is not p-uniform and that there is weak excess supply
for every good. We can then distinguish the following cases:6
– Case 1: pi is not p-seller uniform for any price p ∈ P . There then
exists a good g and sellers i, j ∈ Sg such that there is weak excess
supply for good g and pijg < piig. Then by the Seller Competition As-
sumption (8), there exists qig < piig such that wig(pi−ig, qig) ≥ wig(pi).
Therefore, using the Income Monotonicity Assumption (9), we have
ui(ξi(pi−ig, qig)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi)) and pi is not a strict Nash equilibrium.
– Case 2: pi is p-seller uniform for some p ∈ P . We then have:
∗ Case 2a: There exists i ∈ Bg such that piig < pg. Then by
the Price compatibility Assumption (6), we have ξig(pi) = 0 and
hence ui(ξi(pi)) = 0. Therefore, it is clearly profitable for agent i
to shift to price pg and pi is not a strict Nash equilibrium.
∗ Case 2b: For all i ∈ Bg, piig ≥ pg and, because pi is not uni-
form, for at least one k ∈ Bg, one has pikg > pg. As there is
6In each of the following cases, good g cannot be the nume´raire good because there exist two
different prices for good g in the population.
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weak excess supply for good g, we can apply the Homogeneous
Pricing Assumption (10). Hence there exists q < pikg such that
ui(ξi(pi−ig, q)) ≥ ui(ξ(pi)) and pi is not a strict Nash equilibrium.
We have thus shown that whenever pi is not a p-uniform general equilibrium strat-
egy profile, it is not a strict Nash equilibrium. 
4. Discussion and Examples
In this section, we first illustrate why the conditions put forward in Theorem 1
are necessary to obtain stability results and then provide examples of exchange
mechanisms satisfying the required conditions.
4.1. Convergence and Efficiency
It is clear that at a non-equilibrium p-uniform strategy profile, agents have an incen-
tive to deviate. Indeed, Walras Law implies there is excess demand for one good, so
that buyers are rationed and hence have an incentive to increase their prices slightly
to gain a competitive edge over their competitors. Conversely, there is excess sup-
ply for at least one good so that sellers have an incentive to lower their prices to
gain a competitive edge. These deviations are profitable in our framework with pri-
vate prices because they generally leave the demand and the supply of other agents
unchanged. This is in contrast with the taˆtonnement process where any variation
of the public price changes the complete profile of supply and demand.
If it is relatively straightforward to show that non-equilibrium uniform price
profiles cannot be stable (Price Consistency Assumption (4) and Buyer Competi-
tion Assumption (7) would suffice in this respect), the key questions are how do
agents coordinate on a common price and why are there no strict Nash equilibria
where the market is segmented in sub-markets using different prices? As the fol-
lowing example shows, the key to avoiding this failure is to assume some form of
inefficiency of the allocation mechanism out of equilibrium.
Consider, in an otherwise arbitrary economy, the market for a good with two
buyers (b1 and b2) and two sellers (s1 and s2). Assume that the private price for
the good of s1 and b1 is 1, and this of s2 and b2 is 2. This implies, assuming the
Price Compatibility Assumption (6) holds, that s1 can sell to both b1 and b2 while
s2 can only sell to b2. Assume further that s1 has an endowment of 20 units and s2
an endowment of 6 units while b1 demands 20 units and b2 5 units at the prevailing
price. There is thus excess supply. Assume then that the exchange mechanism is
efficient in the sense that as large a share of supply as possible is allocated given
the price compatibility constraints. We then have:
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• At the prevailing price, s1 supplies 20 units at price 1 to b1 and s2 5 units at
price 2 to b2.
• If s1 increases his price, he loses the demand from b1 and the sole demand
from b2 must be allocated between s1 and s2. The income from s1 then
necessarily decreases.
• If s2 increases his price, he drives himself out of the market and has income
0.
• If s1 decreases his price, he still supplies 20 units to b1 but at a lower price
and hence his income decreases.
• If s2 decreases his price to a price below 1, his income necessarily decreases.
• If s2 decreases his price to a price above 1, he still supplies uniquely to b2
and decreases his income unless the income-elasticity of b2 is greater than
unity.
Hence, unless the income-elasticity of b2 is greater than one, neither buyer has
an incentive to change its price, the Seller Competition Assumption (8) fails to hold
and there exists a stable non-uniform strategy profile. This failure stems from the
fact that we have assumed the exchange mechanism to be efficient. In other words,
if the economy functions efficiently with heterogeneous prices, it can settle in states
where ‘multiple equilibria” coincide in different clusters on the same market and
agents have no incentive to change their prices.
However, assuming that the economy organizes efficiently despite heteroge-
neous prices seems behaviorally inconsistent. In the previous example, it is im-
plausible that b2 agree to trade with s2 despite the presence of a much cheaper
seller, unless there are information imperfections and b2 does not know about s1.
In the proof of Theorem 1, the Seller Competition Assumption (8), the Income
Monotonicity Assumption (9) and the Homogeneous Pricing Assumption (10) im-
plicitly account for these behavioral aspects. In particular, as illustrated by the
examples below, they imply that the exchange mechanism cannot be efficient out
of equilibrium.
4.2. A Taˆtonnement-like Exchange Mechanism
For every economy without no-trade equilibrium, a trivial example of exchange
mechanism satisfying assumptions (4) to (10) is the taˆtonnement-like mechanism
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where no trade takes place unless excess demand is zero. That is the mechanism
defined by:
ξtati (pi) =
{
di(p, p · ei) if pi is a p-uniform equilibrium profile
ei otherwise.
Note that in this setting, extended demand can be defined for (pi,w) ∈ Π×R+ by
δi(pi,w) = di(pii, w) and expected income as
wig(pi) =
{
piig · eig if pi is a p-uniform strategy profile
0 otherwise.
It is then straightforward to check that assumptions (4) to (10) are satisfied. There-
fore, one has:
Corollary 1. If E(u, e) is an economy without no-trade equilibrium, then pi is a
strict Nash equilibrium of the game G(u, e, ξtat) if and only if it is a general market
equilibrium price profile.
One should notice that this specific result holds independently of assumptions
(1), (2) or (3) and hence proves the strategic stability of general equilibrium for
any economy without no-trade equilibria. However, in relation to the discussion
in Section 4.1, we shall emphasize that the taˆtonnement process assumes some
extreme form of inefficiency out of equilibrium: no trade takes place. Hence this
process would be ruled-out if we assumed some form of minimal efficiency such
as considering that when there exist Pareto-improving trades a non-zero fraction of
the gains is indeed seized by the exchange mechanism.
4.3. Price-based Priority
We now explore exchange mechanisms where competition between agents is im-
plemented through constraints on the access to the market.
On the supply side, let us first assume that only the lowest price sellers have
access to the market. That is, if the minimal price for good g is denoted by pˆig =
minj∈Sg pijg, the income of agent i on the market for good g is given by:
wig(pi) =
{
piig · eig if piig = pˆig
0 otherwise.
Accordingly, we assume that demand is based on the prices of the lowest price
sellers, that is for all (pi,w) ∈ pi × R+, we have
δi(pi,w) = di(pˆi, w),
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where pˆi = (pˆi1, . . . , pˆin).
We assume that competition between buyers takes the form of the highest bid-
ding buyers having priority access to the market. That is, for each good, demands
are ordered by decreasing buying price and are fulfilled sequentially until the ad-
missible supply (this from the lowest price sellers) is exhausted. More precisely,
we consider the exchange mechanism ξprio is defined by the following algorithm.
For g = 1 to n {
Sellers[g] = {i ∈ Sg|(piig = pˆig) ∧ (piig ≤ maxk∈Bg pikg)}
Supply[g] =
∑
i∈Sellers[g] eig
Buyers[g] = {j ∈ Bg|pijg ≥ pˆig}
While Buyers[g] 6= ∅ and Supply[g] > 0 {
Priority-Buyers[g] = {j ∈ Buyers[g]|pijg = maxk∈Buyers[g] pikg}
Demand[g] =
∑
j∈Priority-Buyers[g] δjg(pi,wj(pi))
If Supply[g] ≥ Demand[g] Then {
For all j ∈ Priority-Buyers[g]{
ξ
prio
jg (pi) = δjg(pi,wj(pi))(1− φjg(pi))
Supply[g] = Supply[g]− Demand[g]
}
}
Else {
ξ
prio
jg (pi) =
δjg(pi,wj(pi))∑
k∈Priority-Buyers[g] δkg(pi), wk(pi)
Supply[g]
Supply[g] = 0
}
Buyers[g] = Buyers[g]− Priority-Buyers[g]
}
Here φjg : Π→ [0, 1] is a penalty function such that φjg(pi) > 0 if and only if there
is excess supply of good g and pijg > pˆig. As stressed in the discussion of the Ho-
mogeneous Pricing Assumption (10), this penalty is a counterweight to the Buyer
competition Assumption (7) that prevents buyers from indefinitely increasing their
prices in case of excess supply.
In this setting, the Price Consistency Assumption (4) and the Price Compara-
bility Assumption (6) are satisfied by construction. The first part of the Equilibrium
Assumption (5) is trivially verified and the second part holds because we have by
construction for all agents i and all pi ∈ Π, ξprioi (pi) ≤ di(pˆi, pˆi · ei)(1 − φjg(pi)).
The Buyer Competition Assumption (7) holds because if there is excess demand
a buyer who raises his buying price increases his priority without modifying his
demand (because the demand is computed at the sellers’ prices pˆi.) The Homoge-
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neous Pricing Assumption (10) holds because in case of excess supply, a buyer
who decreases his price so as to approach the sellers’ price does not modify his
demand, which is computed at sellers’ price, and is not harmed by the potential de-
crease of his priority order because there is excess supply. The Seller Competition
Assumption (8) clearly holds because a seller who is above the minimal selling
price for a good does not execute any exchanges on that good market and hence
cannot decrease his income by decreasing his price. Finally, the Income Mono-
tonicity Assumption (9) clearly holds if we assume there is no inferior good in the
economy. Otherwise, in the particular case where there is excess supply of inferior
goods and excess demand for normal goods, it could be that an agent who increases
his income decreases his utility when he shifts his demand from inferior to normal
goods, which are rationed. One therefore has:
Corollary 2. If E(u, e) is an economy with no inferior goods and satisfying as-
sumptions (1) to (3) , then pi is a strict Nash equilibrium of the game G(u, e, ξprio)
if and only if it is a general market equilibrium price profile.
In order to dispense of the no inferior-good condition, one could consider that
the agent chooses the optimal expenditure level given the rationing constraints he
faces. With respect to the relation between inefficiency and stability discussed in
Section (4.1), one can notice that the exchange mechanism ξprio is inefficient out of
equilibrium as only the lowest price sellers have access to the market, though there
could be additional matches between high bidding buyers and sellers. This ineffi-
ciency has a quite intuitive behavioral justification: agents are reluctant to purchase
goods at a high price when they are aware that other trades take place at a lower
price. This interpretation is valid, stricto sensu, only if one presumes that each
agent observes the complete set of prices. However, the properties of the exchange
mechanism ξprio can easily be extended to settings with weaker informational re-
quirements. For example, one could consider that all sellers but the most expensive
ones have access to the market and that a buyer determines his prices on the basis
of the admissible seller whose private price is the closest to his. Alternatively, one
could consider that buyers and sellers are connected through a network and that a
buyer buys only from the lowest bidding seller to whom he is connected.
4.4. Bargaining-like Mechanisms
An alternative interpretation of Theorem 1 can be obtained through the prism of the
bargaining literature. Indeed, one can consider that a profile of private prices de-
fines a restricted set of feasible allocations and interpret the choice of an allocation
mechanism as the choice of a solution to the bargaining problem in this set. In this
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setting, Theorem 1 can be interpreted as stating that agents have an incentive on the
one hand to agree on a common price in order to increase the size of the bargaining
set, and on the other hand to deviate from the common price by underbidding or
overbidding their competitors when there is excess supply or demand.
The incentive to agree on a common price is related to the constraints private
prices put on trading possibilities. In this respect, the least stringent condition we
can assume is to consider that access to the market is restricted to traders that have
a possibility to find a trade partner: buyers whose private price for a good is above
the lowest private price of sellers, and conversely sellers whose private price for
a good is below the highest private price of buyers. Accordingly, given a private
price vector pi, we define the set of acceptable buyers as:
Bg(pi) = {i ∈ Bg|piig ≥ min
j∈Sg
pijg},
and the set of acceptable sellers as:
Sg(pi) =
{
i ∈ Sg
(
pijg ≤ max
i∈Bg
piig
)
∧
(
pijg ≤ max
pik,g 6=pij,g
pikg
) }
.
Note that in order to induce some competitions among sellers, the last condi-
tion in the definition of Sg(pi) implies that the highest bidding seller is excluded
from the market (in case the strategy profile is not p-uniform). We then define the
extended demand of agent i as δi(pi,w) = di(pii, w) and assume agent i can raise
a positive income only from the market to which he has access. That is:
wig(pi) =
{
piig · eig if i ∈ Sh(pi)
0 otherwise
Our bargaining set then is the set of price-feasible allocations defined as fol-
lows.
Definition 2. The set of price feasible allocations A(e, pi) is the subset of feasible
allocations A(e) such that for every x ∈ A(e, pi) we have:
1. ∀(i, h) ∈ A× Ci, xih > 0⇒ i ∈ Bh(pi);
2.
∑
i∈Bh(pi) xih ≤
∑
j∈Sh(pi) ejh;
3. pii · xi ≤ wi(pi).
The set A(e, pi) is always non-empty because it contains the zero allocation
where for each agent i, one has xi = 0. Now, a feasible allocation is price feasible
if it is such that (1) only admissible buyers receive a positive allocation, (2) trade
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takes place only between admissible buyers and sellers, (3) each agent satisfies
its private budget constraint. More broadly, Definition 2 expresses the fact that as
agents agree on the valuation of goods, i.e as private prices become more simi-
lar, the number of successful transactions grows. In particular when a p-uniform
price profile is reached, then the market includes each agent, and the constraint his
private price place on a given agent is simply his private budget constraint.
Agents will thus have an incentive to agree on a common price if they actu-
ally gain from an increased number of successful transactions. To express this idea
formally, let us consider an exchange mechanism ξbarg such that for all pi ∈ Π,
ξbarg(pi) ∈ A(e, pi). Then, agents will gain from an increase in the market’s size
(provided his budget constraint is not being strengthened) if the exchange mech-
anism ξbarg satisfies the monotonicity condition that is standard in the bargaining
literature since the seminal paper by Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975, that is:
Assumption 11 (KS-Monotonicity). If pi and pi′ are such thatA(e, pi) ⊂ A(e, pi′)
then for all i = 1 · · ·n, we have ui(ξbargi (pi′)) ≥ ui(ξbargi (pi)).
It is then clear from the definitions of δi(pi,w), wig(pi) and A(e, pi) that the
Price Consistency Assumption (4) and the Price Compatibility Assumption (6)
hold. Moreover, the Seller Competition Assumption (8) holds for ξbarg because
the most expensive seller is excluded of the market according to the definition of
Sh(pi) and hence he can always increase his income by decreasing his price. Fi-
nally, the Income Monotonicity Assumption (9), and the Homogeneous Pricing
Assumption (10) as well as the second part of the Equilibrium Assumption (5) are
clear consequences of the KS-Monotonicity Assumption (11). In particular, the
second condition in the Equilibrium Assumption (5) holds because of the private
price constraint in the definition of the set of price-feasible allocations. Thus, using
Theorem 1, we have:
Corollary 3. Let ξbarg be such that for all pi ∈ Pi, ξbarg(pi) ∈ A(e, pi), the
Equilibrium Assumption (5), the Buyer Competition Assumption (7), and the KS-
Monotonicity Assumption (11) hold. Then pi is a strict Nash equilibrium of the
game G(u, e, ξbarg) if and only if it is a general market equilibrium price profile.
In other words, for bargaining exchange mechanisms, the monotonicity con-
dition suffices to guarantee that agents have an incentive to agree on a common
price. It then suffices to assume there is competition among buyers and that the
allocations at a general equilibrium are efficient in order to ensure the stability of
general equilibrium price profiles.
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5. The Scarf Economy
The examples introduced in the preceding section show that Theorem 1 can be ap-
plied in a wide variety of settings. Still, these examples were required to be highly
stylized to prove stability. In this section, we investigate numerically whether our
results extend to more complex models of individual behavior. More precisely, we
introduce a Markovian model of price adjustment, for which the necessary con-
ditions of Theorem 1 do not necessarily hold but which retain the key features of
our model: prices are set in a decentralized manner and updated according to an
evolutionary mechanism. In this setting, we give computer simulation evidence of
convergence to general equilibrium.
We place ourselves in the Scarf (1960) economy, a well-known example of in-
stability of the taˆtonnement. Namely, we consider an economy with three goods
(n = 3) and three types of agents (m = 3). Agents of type 1 have utility
u1(x1, x2, x3) = min(x1/ω1, x2/ω2), and initial endowment (ω1, 0, 0), agents of
type 2 have utility u2(x1, x2, x3) = min(x2/ω2, x3/ω3) and initial endowment (0, ω2, 0)
and agents of type 3 have utility u3(x1, x2, x3) = min(x3/ω3, x1/ω1) and initial en-
dowment (0, 0, ω3).We let (ω1, ω2, ω3) = (10, 20, 400) so that equilibrium relative
prices, which must be proportional to p∗ = (40, 20, 1), are extremely unequal (see
Anderson et al. 2004) .
In order to simulate price dynamics in this setting, we consider 1000 agents of
each type. Each agent is initially equipped with a private price vector and with an
inventory of goods equal to its initial endowment.7 Every period, agents engage
in a trading process whose outcome depends on the distribution of private prices.
This first process can be seen as a dynamic version of the exchange mechanisms
introduced in the preceding section and allows to relate the utility gained by each
agent to its private price. Every ten periods,8 prices are updated according to an
evolutionary mechanism where the average utility obtained is used as a measure of
fitness of the private price used by the agent.
The trading process is implemented as follows. At the beginning of each pe-
riod, the inventory of each agent is reset to the value of its initial endowment. Each
agent, in random order, is then designated a trade initiator and is paired with a ran-
domly chosen responder, who can either accept or reject the proposed trade. Each
7More precisely, we assume that there is a smallest possible positive price, and each component
of an agent’s price vector is drawn from the uniform distribution on the multiples of this smallest
possible price in the interval (0, 1).
8This periodicity can be changed without modifying qualitatively the results. Considering a larger
number of periods allows a better approximation of the expected utility of each agent in the trading
process.
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agent is thus an initiator exactly once and a responder on average once per period.9
In order to define the outcome of an individual trade, we have to introduce the
following classification of goods. For an agent of type i, the good i is called his
production good, the additional good that he consumes γi = mod(i+1, 3) is called
his consumption good and the good τi = mod(i+1, 2) that he neither produces nor
consumes is called his transaction good.10 Let us then consider the initiator a is an
agent of type ia,with private price pa ∈ R3+ and stock of goods xa ∈ R3+ while the
responder has private price pb ∈ R3+ and stock of goods xb ∈ R3+. In this setting,
a trade of good k against good ` is acceptable if the trade ratio proposed by the
initiator is profitable according to the responder and if the initiator and responder
indeed have the corresponding goods in stock, that is:
pa,`
pa,k
≥ pb,`
pb,k
∧ xa,k > 0 ∧ xb,` > 0. (2)
The initiator a then proposes transactions in the following order:
(τia , γia)  (ia, γia)  (ia, τia) (3)
That is the initiator tries first to trade his transaction good against his consump-
tion good, second his production good against his consumption good and third his
production good against his transaction good. The transaction that actually gets ex-
ecuted is the first one that is acceptable in the sense of condition (2). The amounts
the initiator proposes to depend on the type of the transaction:
• In a (τia , γia) transaction, the initiator proposes his whole stock of transac-
tion good xτia against pτiaxτia/pγia units of his consumption good.
• In a (ia, γia) transaction, the initiator bases his request on its utility maximiz-
ing demand dia(pa, pa,ia · xa,ia) and proposes to trade xia − dia,ia(pa, pa,ia ·
xa,ia) units of his production good against dia,ib(pa, pa,ia ·xa,ia) units of his
consumption good.
• In a (ia, τia) transaction, the initiator tries to split his inventory equally be-
tween production and transaction goods. Therefore he proposes to trade half
his stock of production good, that is, xa,ia/2 units, against pa,iaxa,ia/2pa,τia
units of his transaction good.
9Our results are not qualitatively modified if the number of trading opportunities per period is
increased.
10We denote by mod(u, v) the rest in the Euclidian division of u by v.
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After a successful trade, each agent consumes whatever is feasible from his in-
ventory, i.e he consumes the share of goods he holds in the required proportions
(ωi, ωγi). His utility is updated accordingly.
Hence, trading behavior is based on simple rules of thumb and clearly not
optimal. However this lack of optimality is perfectly in line with the requirement
put forward in Section (4.1) that exchanged mechanisms should not be too efficient
out of equilibrium. As a matter of facts, simulation results (see below) show that
despite (or because of) the simplicity of the exchange mechanism, the feedback
effect utility has on the evolution of private prices suffices to coordinate agents on
equilibrium.
This feedback effect is implemented through a stochastic imitation model a`
la Schlag (1998) for which we use as measure of fitness the average utility of
consumption over the previous ten periods. Every ten periods, 5% of agents are
randomly chosen to review their strategy, i.e their vector of private prices. Re-
viewing agents are matched with randomly selected partners of the same type and
the least successful of the pair then copies the private prices of the more success-
ful. In addition to this imitation process, there is a mutation process in which 1%
of the agents are selected and randomly increase or decrease their prices by 10%.
It is well known that this mutation process renders the evolution of strategies er-
godic (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1997). Moreover, it can be shown (see Benaim
and Weibull, 2003) that in the large-population limit, stochastic imitation models
are well approximated by the replicator dynamic. Thus, the results of Section 3
suggest that we should observe convergence of prices to their equilibrium values.
Figure 1: Convergence of Price to Equilibrium in a Three-good Scarf Economy with Pri-
vate Prices
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The results of a typical run are exhibited in Figure 1. Each of the curves in
Figure 1 is given by (p∗−p)/p∗ where p∗ is the equilibrium relative price. Because
initial prices are generated by uniform distributions on the unit interval, the initial
mean price of good 3 is about 40 times its equilibrium value, and the price of
good 2 is about 20 times its equilibrium value. Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to
the oscillatory behavior of the taˆtonnement process in this setting Scarf (1960),
the system settles rapidly in a steady state where prices assume their equilibrium
values. That is, we observe convergence to general equilibrium.
Similar convergence results have been obtained in economies with Leonti-
eff preferences (see Gintis 2012) as well as in arbitrarily large economies with
nested, arbitrarily heterogeneous, CES utility functions where fitness is measured
by traded volumes rather than by utility (Gintis 2013). These results suggest that
in a setting where agents use private prices as strategies, evolutionary dynamics
based on imitation of success (Schlag, 1998; Benaim and Weibull, 2003) can pro-
vide dynamical foundations for general market equilibrium in settings where the
taˆtonnement mechanism fails.
6. Conclusion
We have introduced a new class of market games in which agents use private prices
as strategies. In this framework, provided the exchange process implements some
form of competition both between buyers and between sellers, strict Nash equilib-
ria coincide with general market equilibria. This result has two main corollaries.
First, it implies that competitive equilibria can be strategically stable even in small
economies. Second, it implies that competitive equilibria have good local stability
properties under a large class of evolutionary dynamics.
The major innovation of our model is the use of private prices, one set for
each agent, in place of the standard assumption of a uniform public price faced
by all agents. The private price assumption is a natural assumption for a fully
decentralized market system not in equilibrium, because there is in fact no natural
way to define a common price system except in equilibrium. With private prices,
each individual is free to alter his private prices at will, market conditions alone
ensuring that something approximating a uniform system of prices will prevail in
the long run.
Our results suggest that a micro-economic theory of the formation of prices
based on evolutionary processes is worth considering. Such an approach can in
particular be used to develop micro-founded models of macro-economic dynam-
ics that account for disequilibrium and the endogenous emergence of aggregate
volatility (see Mandel et al., 2015, for preliminary work in that direction).
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